Thursday, November 20, 2008
Tall? Wide? Spherical?
The thing St. Scobie didn't mention: the essay just seems to be wrong in many, many ways. The essay's author, Umair Haque, calls McCain's campaign a traditional "command-and-control" organization. That's wrong. It was a freakin' mess. With people coming and going, exiled and rehabilitated, swerving off-message, speaking at cross-purposes, hell, in Sarah Palin's case, speaking in tongues. McCain's campaign had neither anyone in command nor any capacity to exert control over events. It collapsed into a blur of near-daily tactical and strategic shifts and ended in infighting and finger-pointing. Obama, on the other hand, Haque claims, succeeded because his organization was "spherical - a tightly controlled core, surrounded by self-organizing cells of volunteers." True, but why wouldn't an organization of the type Haque describes derail due to an inability to discipline volunteers and control the organization's message? His suggestion is that Obama's organization was all about passion, and discipline and coordination were tossed aside. That is obviously wrong. Obama won because he (or at least key actors within his organization) understood that they could trust volunteers if the campaign engineered the tools and the messages volunteers employed. Campaign supporters shared postings, YouTube videos, and talking-points manufactured by the Obama campaign. Volunteers broadcasted what the Obama campaign wanted them to broadcast. If we want to use Haque's image - of Obama's organization as a sphere - the orb the campaign most resembles is the sun, where everything is generated in the core, and the remaining structure (the radiative zone, the convective zone, the photosphere, the chromosphere and the corona, for you sun worshippers) merely functions to transmit the energy manufactured within the astral core.
Another thing Haque seems utterly wrong about: he claims that Obama succeeded because he "dispensed almost entirely with strategy in its most naïve sense: strategy as gamesmanship or positioning." Huh? The more I watched the Obama campaign, the more I was convinced they were masters of gamesmanship and positioning and shaping the news cycle. The thing that really brought this into focus for me happened back during the closing days of the primaries. On May 13th, Hillary won West Virginia by 30 points - taking 67% of the vote to Obama's 26%. For a day, the media commentators were talking about Hillary's win as proof that Obama couldn't succeed with working-class white voters. Then, on May 15th, Obama appeared with John Edwards in Michigan to claim Edwards' endorsement. Which, of course, in retrospect, with Edwards wandering in the political wilderness, now seems meaningless. However, at the time, it was a perfectly played card. The Obama campaign most certainly had that endorsement in their pocket for some time, but they waited until the West Virginia primary - which they clearly knew they would lose - to publicize the endorsement, and in the process took the headlines away from Hillary.
Thursday, November 13, 2008
Joe Lieberman is Peter Pettigrew
Anyway, my goal here is to offer a basic primer for understanding why Barack Obama wants to save Joe Lieberman from the wrath of the Democratic party. I want to make this so simple anyone can get it.
We know that Obama is a Harry Potter fan, and has read all seven books with his daughters. He has to be aware of the fate of Peter Pettigrew, otherwise known as Wormtail, the shape-shifting wizard who possesses the ability to transform into a rat. The resemblence to Lieberman is hard to miss.
We learn in Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban that Peter Pettigrew betrayed the Order of the Phoenix, the forces of tolerance and decency, to side with the evil Lord Voldemort and his followers, the Death Eaters. When Voldemort was unable to eliminate Harry, and in the process was instead transformed into a mere shadow, Pettigrew slinked away and concealed himself for years, disguised as a rat. When Harry and Wormtail's paths crossed again, Harry's friends, angered by Wormtail's betrayal, sought revenge. Just to be clear, Sirius Black wanted to do more than relieve Wormtail of a few Committee Chairmanships and kick him out of the caucus. He wanted to kill Wormtail. By comparison, the Democratic leadership in the Senate is exercising restraint.
But, to get to the point, Harry intervened and saved Wormtail, earning, in the process, a life debt, forging an obligation on Wormtail's part. It wasn't clear at the time what the result would be. But, years later, in the book that wraps up Harry's story, we learn that Wormtail's magical debt is paid when he hesitates to deliver Harry back into the clutches of Voldemort. At precisely the moment when Harry was trapped and it looked like the forces of evil would triumph, Pettigrew delays, allowing Harry to escape.
Obama knows the dark forces have merely been driven into the shadows. They will do all they can to destroy him and regain power. But at some point, perhaps in the closing days of his first term, when he needs a legislative victory to survive, Lieberman will be obligated to step in and help. When he does, I suspect Lieberman will learn, as Wormtail did, that the dark forces are far less forgiving.
Friday, November 7, 2008
The selling of Brand Obama
The Obama campaign understood that "people influence people." Every time a new supporter signed up to be one of Obama's Facebook friends, that supporter's new affiliation was automatically broadcast to all of his or her Facebook friends. On average, each Facebook user has 150 "friends" plugged into his or her network, some have as many as 600, a few have many more. Of course, many of these "friends" already share political leanings, and many may also be part of Obama's Facebook community. Still, doing the math, we're talking about a potential social network of 367 million people - greater than the entire population of the U.S.* I wish I had better tools to estimate the likely number of distinct individuals pulled in as friends of the 2.8 million Obama supporters on Facebook. It's big. Let's leave it at that.
Many of these supporters also set up their own accounts on My.BarackObama.com, where they could blog about their own campaigning and canvassing efforts, post photos, and set up their own fundraising pages with their own messages. As people registered on My.BarackObama.com, the campaign gathered information about them. Some of this information was volunteered - name, address, email, cell number - but the campaign also deposited a cookie on each vistor's web browser, allowing the campaign to track where that supporter went after he or she left the site. This allowed the campaign to know where the supporter was getting his or her news and entertainment, helping to craft advertising plans.
Ultimately, every registered supporter was recruited, by carefully targeted emails, to donate, or volunteer at phone banks, or contribute to canvassing and get out the vote efforts. When volunteers showed up at campaign headquarters, they were given lists that were made more precise by the campaign's capability to gather information from its web-based resources. All of these campaign offices, set up across the country, even in states Democrats often skipped, were financed by the unrivalled web-based fund-raising accomplished by the campaign. Some estimates suggest the campaign raised somewhere in the neighborhood of $700 million dollars.
In the end, of course, Obama won the race and in the process captured 7.7 million of the 11.7 million voters under 29 who cast a ballot. The number of voters under 29 was greater than the number of senior citizens who voted. It will take some time to fully understand the numbers, and grasp what motivated voters and which messages caught their attention. But there seems broad consenus that Obama's bet on younger voters paid off, and his use of the web and the power of social networking sites generated armies of volunteers and helped generate unimagined financial support.
Obama's campaign had the insight to see the web as a campaign tool with impressive reach, and, more so than any political campaign before, they grasped the utility of social networking sites to connect with people (and connect people to people). They brought in the talent to give shape and form to their ambitions. Furthermore - and this is a powerful lesson for future campaigns and social movements - they trusted millions of supporters to do a great deal of the work, downloading videos and passing them around, creating their own content and sharing it. This might seem like a risky move for a campaign so focused on communicating a carefully scripted message - emphasizing the candidate's commitment to change, while backgrounding discussions of race - but the campaign was counting on a preexisting set of practices it understood very well. Or rather, that Chris Hughes knew well. From his work on Facebook, Hughes knew that most supporters would share videos and other content crafted by the campaign. What the campaign counted on was that their message would be passed hand-to-hand, shared among "friends."
The Obama campaign was confronted with a workplace extending across the full landscape of the United States, and had to deploy "workers" who were unpaid and had no formal position within the organization. Yet, for their model to work, they needed to trust these supporters to broadcast their message and carry out the groundwork necessary to get out the vote. This, it seems to me, is a quintessentially progressive impulse - Obama trusted us to help him do the work that was necessary to seize the White House. But he's also no fool, he wasn't going to put all his money on us going out there and building buzz on blogs and capturing the look and feel of his campaign with our clumsy photos. He gave the professionals some work to do, and then asked us to pitch in. Seems like a model for government too, doesn't it?
* My own imperfect research shows that 2 Facebook friends probably have 37 other friends in common, assuming they have 150 friends each.
Thursday, November 6, 2008
Blue America
Republicans haven’t yet grasped the enormity of their failure or the resounding rejection of their governmental ideology. But as we sift through the data, and more importantly, assess the meaning of this election, it will become clear that Americans have rejected the idea that government should do nothing when a quarter of the country can’t afford health care, when our schools are failing, when Wall Street recklessly gambles away our retirement savings and our kids’ college money. We can’t sit by while a major American city disappears under flood waters we knew were coming. Government should facilitate scientific research, not suppress it. It should hold our soldiers back, until all efforts to avoid conflict have failed, and never throw them into a slow-motion massacre in pursuit of oil or to establish the validity of a new strategic blueprint. All of this – all of this – was rejected on Tuesday. So don’t believe conservatives who blame “this President” or “the financial crisis” or “their candidate.” This was a repudiation of conservative principles. Look at the map above. It is a graphic representation of some remarkable data. The darker the blue, the greater the shift in voters’ preferences toward the Democratic party. The paler blue hues show a less dramatic shift. The rose colored counties became even more Republican this year. Don’t misunderstand this, we are nor looking at a Democratic Idaho, but compared to 2004, more voters in
I can't help but think that we have witnessed the beginning of a sea-change in American politics. Voters under 24 voted for Obama, even in deeply, deeply red counties. In
Wednesday, November 5, 2008
Hyde Park = the sun
My neighborhood in
Tuesday, November 4, 2008
Citizen army
One sad, sad result in tonight's otherwise happy political news: Voters in Arizona, Florida, and California voted to deny gays and lesbians the right to marry. In Arkansas, they voted to deny gays the right to adopt children. But if you dig into the numbers, discriminatory attitudes are confined to old people. In California, 67% of voters between 18 and 24 voted against the ban. Imagine combining the Obama campaign's gift for bringing young voters into the process - and giving them real responsibilities in organizing and operating the machinery of the campaign - with the attitudinal shift represented by those numbers from California. The result would be a citizen corps that would sweep away discrimination and intolerance.